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The article discusses the problem with the use of statistical sampling in
litigation. Sample-based research is increasingly used in cases as diverse as
products liability, antitrust, intellectual property, and criminal law. Samplebased research provides objective evidence upon which decisions, damages,
and liability may rest. Despite its importance, however, statistical evidence is
often misused and misunderstood by attorneys who may be unfamiliar with the
underlying form of analysis. The paper explores common errors when using
litigative samples, comments upon best practices for the use in law of samplebased research, and demonstrates the importance of sound statistical
sampling and data collection in a recent case.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent decades, statistical sampling has grown in importance in
litigation. Used in cases as diverse as class-action suits regarding
discrimination or product defects, collective trials of mass torts, and
instances of “antitrust, environment, tax, rate-making, and a variety of
other cases in which issues of fact are sought to be resolved,” sample-based
research provides solid quantitative evidence on which rulings, damages,
and liability can and have been based.1 Unfortunately, while the theory
behind sampling is straightforward, implementing such a theory can lead to
significant problems for those unaware of the statistical work that must be
done before and after data collection to ensure that any resulting analysis is
accurate and useful. This problem is confounded by the lack of experience
many attorneys have with statistical theory and practice. This paper will
address several common errors made when implementing theoretically
sound litigative samples, comment upon best practices for sample-based
research, and demonstrate the importance of sound statistical sampling and
data collection techniques in a recent case.

II. OVERVIEW OF THE SAMPLING PROCESS
Sampling gives researchers a statistically sound, legally admissible,
way to make predictions about a large population.2 As opposed to a
census, which is a collection of relevant data about all members of a
specific population, a sample is a portion of that population from which one
can collect data, then extrapolate from the results to the population as a
whole.3 However, as David H. Kaye and David A. Freedman noted,

1. The Special Committee on Empirical Data in Legal Decision Making, Recommendations on
Pretrial Proceedings in Cases with Voluminous Data, in THE EVOLVING ROLE OF STATISTICAL
ASSESSMENTS AS EVIDENCE IN THE COURTS 245 (Stephen E. Fienberg, ed. 1989). See also Michael J.
Saks & Peter David Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits of Aggregation and
Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 815, 824, 835 (1992); Joseph C. Bright, Jr.,
Joseph B. Kadane & Daniel S. Nagin, Statistical Sampling in Tax Audits, 13 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 310,
310 (1988); Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Sampling Liability, 85 VA. L. REV. 329, 339 (1999).
2. David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in REFERENCE MANUAL
ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 211, 214 (3d ed., 2011); Shari Seidman Diamond, Reference Guide on Survey
Research, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 359, 363–67 (3d ed. 2011). See also The
Special Committee on Empirical Data in Legal Decision Making, Recommendations on Pretrial
Proceedings in Cases with Voluminous Data, in THE EVOLVING ROLE OF STATISTICAL ASSESSMENTS
AS EVIDENCE IN THE COURTS 245, 245 (Stephen E. Fienberg ed. 1989); Michael J. Saks & Peter David
Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits of Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial of
Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 815, 826–27(1992); Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Sampling
Evidence at the Crossroads, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 969, 971 (2007).
3. Kaye & Freedman, supra note 2, at 216–17.
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“inferences from the part to the whole are justified only when the sample is
representative.”4 A sample that accurately represents the population from
which it is drawn can be a powerful tool.5 An unrepresentative sample, on
the other hand, can be useless or even harmful to one’s position.6 This is
important in litigation for two reasons. First, it presents an opportunity to
present evidence that can support a compelling argument. Second, there is
the danger of unreliable data going unchallenged if practitioners and the
court are unfamiliar with the research method.7 While it has been said of
law students that they “are typically smart people who do not like math,”8 it
behooves attorneys to learn the effective use of sampling both to promote a
client’s position and to block misleading or unsubstantiated evidence from
consideration.

III. HISTORY OF SAMPLING AND ITS ADMISSIBILITY
A. USE AS EVIDENCE MATHEMATICALLY AND SCIENTIFICALLY PRECEDED
LEGAL ADMISSIBILITY
The origins of sampling are obscure, perhaps beginning with the
notion of a food taster to test whether a king’s food had been poisoned.9
On a more philosophical level, some commentators view empirical
research itself as the first example of sampling. Since “all empirical
knowledge is, in a fundamental sense, derived from incomplete or
imperfect observations” it is, therefore, “a sampling of experience.”10 By
the eighteenth century, it was well-established that taking a sample of a
population (rather than a census) could lead to mathematically valid
results.11 Still, it was a flawed process. Prior to the twentieth century,
sampling (or “partial investigations”) was conducted by a researcher who
4. Kaye & Freedman, supra note 2, at 216–17.
5. Diamond, supra note 2, at 362, 372.
6. Id. at 377–78.
7. Lea Brilmayer & Lewis Kornhauser, Review: Quantitative Methods and Legal Decisions, 46
U. CHI. L. REV. 116, 126 (1978). Margaret Bull Kovera & Bradley D. McAuliff, The Effects of Peer
Review and Evidence Quality on Judge Evaluations of Psychological Science: Are Judges Effective
Gatekeepers?, 85 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 574, 574 (2000). Margaret Bull Kovera, Melissa B. Russano,
& Bradley D. McAuliff, Assessment of the Commonsense Psychology Underlying Daubert: Legal
Decision Makers’ Abilities to Evaluate Expert Evidence in Hostile Work Environment Cases, 8
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 180, 180 (2002).
8. Michael J. Saks, Legal Policy Analysis and Evaluation, 44 AM. PSYCHOL. 1110, 1115 (1989).
9. Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Sampling Evidence at the Crossroads, 80 S. CAL. L. REV.
969, 971 n.11 (2007) (citing Frederick F. Stephan, History of the Uses of Modern Sampling Procedures,
434 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 12, 13 (1948)).
10. Id. at n.12.
11. CHARLES COULSTON GILLISPIE, PIERRE-SIMON LAPLACE, 1749-1827: A LIFE IN EXACT
SCIENCE 93–94 (1997).
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selected those whom he considered to represent the larger whole.12 The
inherent problem in this technique, of course, is obvious: a bias in selection
biases the outcome. It was not until the twentieth century that the process
of random sampling became an established form of empirical research.13
Randomization, properly conducted, eliminates biases that can invalidate
the inference.14
Attempts were made to decrease selection bias by creating a
“purposive selection,” i.e., a selection of representative participants.15
Problematically, this process called upon the designer to decide what
characteristics qualified as “representative” of the pool.
Further
development of “purposive selection” led to the use of a quota system,
which required pollsters to obtain responses from groups with quotas
imposed for particular characteristics (for example, age, sex, or income).16
The purpose, again, was to try to obtain representative responses.
One early demonstration of “purposive quota sampling” involved the
conflicting predictions of the presidential election of 1936.17 The Literary
Digest, a longtime predictor of election outcomes, used lists obtained from
those who owned telephones or automobiles.18 Based on their survey of
more than ten million people, the journal predicted that the winner would
be Alfred Landon, beating Franklin D. Roosevelt by a 55-41 margin.19
George Gallup, using a much smaller sample of 3,000 people, but with
quotas over six variables predicted Roosevelt’s win by a 54-46 margin.20
Roosevelt won with 61 percent of the vote.21 Gallup’s prediction accuracy
was aided by the use of quota sampling, but also by avoiding the selection
bias of culling only respondents who owned what were, at the time,
expensive and relatively uncommon consumer goods.22 The Literary
Digest became defunct two years later,23 while Gallup, of course, went on

12. Walker & Monahan, supra note 9, at 971–72.
13. Id. at 971.
14. Joseph B. Kadane, Probability Sampling in Litigation, 18 CONN. INS. L.J. 297, 297 (20112012).
15. Walker & Monahan, supra note 9, at 971–72.
16. Kaye & Freedman, supra note 2, at 225.
17. Walker & Monahan, supra note 9, at 972.
18. Cynthia Crossen, Fiasco in 1936 Survey Brought ‘Science’ to Election Polling, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 2, 2006, at B.1.
19. Peverill Squire, Why the 1936 Literary Digest Poll Failed, 52 PUB. OPIN. Q. 125, 126–27
(1988).
20. Walker & Monahan, supra note 9, at 973.
21. Squire, supra note 19, at 127.
22. Crossen, supra note 18. But cf. Dominic Lusinchi, “President” Landon and the 1936 Literary
Digest Poll: Were Automobile and Telephone Owners to Blame?, 36 SOCIAL SCIENCE HISTORY 23, 32
(2012), available at http://ssh.dukejournals.org/content/36/1/23.full.pdf+html (noting that nonresponse
bias was a more significant factor in the error); Squire, supra note 19, at 131 (low response rate and
nonresponse bias were significant factors).
23. Frank Rich, The Moose Stops Here, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2008, at 12.
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to be a pioneer in the field.24
B. PROBLEMS WITH EXPERT TESTIMONY GENERALLY: THE TREND FROM
FRYE TO DAUBERT
Concurrent with the gradual acceptance of sampling results was a
changing legal acceptance of expert evidence generally.25 Common law
originally made no distinction between expert testimony and any other
witness testimony.26 The first apparent record of expert testimony
introduced by a party was in Folkes v. Chadd.27 Early American cases
permitted the use of expert testimony if the evidence was beyond the
understanding of a typical juror and an expert of relevant expertise could
testify in ways that would assist the jurors’ understanding.28
As scientific methods became more refined and more accepted
generally, they became more accepted in the courtroom.29 Courts initially
performed little review of scientific or expert evidence, simply weighing
probative value against prejudicial effect.30 The weight, if any, that such
testimony was to be accorded rested largely with triers of fact.31 This
changed with Frye v. United States.32 Alphonse Frye, accused of murder,
sought to introduce evidence of his innocence based on a test created by
psychologist and Harvard professor William Moulton Marston.33 Professor
Marston had developed a forerunner of a lie detector test and was prepared
to testify that the test had demonstrated Frye’s innocence.34 The trial court
excluded the evidence as too speculative.35 In affirming the decision, the
U.S. Court of Appeals noted that “when a scientific principle or discovery
24. See generally Steven H. Chaffee, George Gallup and Ralph Nafziger: Pioneers of Audience
Research, 3 MASS. COMM. & SOC’Y 317 (2000).
25. See D.H. Kaye, The Dynamics of Daubert: Methodology, Conclusions, and Fit in Statistical
and Econometric Studies, 87 VA. L. R. 1933, 1941 (2001).
26. Id. at 1938 (citing SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, 483 (1958)).
27. John Basten, The Court Expert in Civil Trials – A Comparative Appraisal, 40 MOD. L. REV.
174, 175–76 (1977) (citing 99 Folkes v. Chadd, Eng. Rep. 589, 589–90 (1972)) (noting that before the
16th century, what we would today call experts were members of the jury. Until Folkes v. Chadd, it is
unclear whether experts were called by the court or by parties). Cf. TAL GOLAN, LAWS OF MEN AND
LAWS OF NATURE: THE HISTORY OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERT TESTIMONY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 20–
22 (2004) (By the sixteenth century, the process of having the parties call expert witnesses was well
established in England. This is distinct from the practice of permitting court-appointed experts. The
earliest reference for the latter is 1299, when physicians and surgeons were called to testify in London
concerning the medical value of wolf flesh.).
28. See, e.g., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 23 (John W. Strong ed., West Group 6th ed. 2006).
29. Kaye, supra note 25, at 1938–39.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
33. See id. See also William G. Iacono & Christopher J. Patrick, Polygraph (“Lie Detector”)
Testing: The State of the Art, in THE HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY (Allen K. Hess & Irving
B. Weiner eds., 1999).
34. See Frye, 293 F. at 1013; see also Iacono & Patrick, supra note 33.
35. Id.
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crosses the line between the experimental and the demonstrable stages is
difficult to determine,”36 that expert evidence could be admitted only when
it had gained general acceptance in the field of expertise.37
The Frye “general acceptance” standard survived until Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.38 In Daubert, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that trial judges had a “gatekeeping role” that required them to admit
only evidence that was reliable.39 This required courts to establish both the
type of evidence warranting increased scrutiny and then to determine
whether it was sufficiently reliable to warrant admission.40 There were two
obvious problems: first, determining what kinds of evidence triggered this
heightened judicial scrutiny and second, reducing the risk that a court
would wrongfully exclude evidence from a jury.41 The Frye standard was
modified when the U.S. Supreme Court extended the reliability standard to
all expert testimony.42 While Kumho therefore solved the “boundary
problem” of determining when the court’s gatekeeping function was
triggered,43 it remained a risk that courts would improperly usurp a jury’s
role in considering the weight to be given expert testimony (the “usurpation
problem”44).45 The Federal Rules of Evidence, however, “admit a
somewhat broader range of scientific testimony than would have been
admissible under Frye” while leaving in place a trial court’s “gatekeeping”
role in screening the reliability of such evidence.46 The judicial role was
expanded in General Electric Co. v. Joiner, which encouraged trial courts
to examine the validity not only of the scientific principles and methods but
to review, as well, the expert’s conclusions. Encouraging an integrated and
comprehensive approach to admissibility, the court noted that “conclusions
and methodology are not entirely distinct from one another.”47 A court
may properly exclude evidence, the Joiner court held, when “there is
simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion
proffered.”48 This calls for a much-expanded role for the judiciary in
evaluating the admission of expert testimony.

36. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
37. Id.
38. 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993).
39. Id. at 597.
40. Id. at 592–93.
41. See Kaye, supra note 25, at 1941–47.
42. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999).
43. Kaye, supra note 25, at 1935.
44. Id.
45. Id. For an example of a rebuke of an appellate court’s “overly stringent” exclusion of expert
testimony, see Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 143 (1997).
46. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 142.
47. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 142.
48. Id.
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C. PROBLEMS WITH LEGAL USE OF STATISTICAL EVIDENCE
While courts are asked to increase their scrutiny of not only an
expert’s methodology and principles but the expert’s conclusions, attorneys
and judges get little exposure to the type of training needed for meaningful
analysis of statistical evidence.49 “Law students,” after all, “are typically
smart people who do not like math.”50 Historically, this usually resulted in
skepticism of such evidence.51 We therefore examine the early resistance
to the use of statistical evidence and its gradual judicial acceptance.
1. Early Resistance to Use of Statistical Evidence in the Courtroom
The first reported introduction of statistical analysis may be in
Robinson v. Mandell.52 In a will contest, Professors Oliver Wendell
Holmes and Louis Agassiz countered the testimony of fellow Harvard
Professor Benjamin Peirce on whether codicil signatures were traced.53
Peirce testified that, as a professor of mathematics, the chances that the
disputed signature’s characteristics matched a known original was “once in
2,666 millions of millions of millions”—a number, he testified, that “far
transcends human experience.”54 As late as 1953, the Supreme Court of
Florida refused to admit a public opinion survey of community sentiment,
noting that not only was the survey hearsay,55 but that “its competency was
suspect.”56 Subsequently, the California Supreme Court reversed a
criminal conviction after a college mathematics instructor testified that a
combination of characteristics of the criminal suspects was one in twelve
million.57 While challenging the mathematical basis for the expert’s
conclusions, the decision rested not on the validity of the statistical
calculations, but instead on the court’s finding that the study’s prejudicial
impact outweighed its probative value.58
49. Michael I. Meyerson & William Meyerson, Significant Statistics: The Unwitting Policy
Making of Mathematically Ignorant Judges, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 771, 772 (2010).
50. Michael J. Saks, Legal and Policy Analysis and Evaluation, 44 AM. PSYCHOL. 1110, 1115
(1989).
51. Id. See also Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 1477, 1479 (1999).
52. 20 F. Cas. 1027 (C.C.D. Mass. 1868) (No. 11,959).
53. Kaye, supra note 25, at 1940–41.
54. Paul Meier & Sandy Zabell, Benjamin Peirce and the Howland Will, 75 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N
497, 499 (1980). For discussion, see Kaye, supra note 25, at 1941.
55. Regarding the observation that public survey data is hearsay, see Zippo Manufacturing Co. v.
Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 682–83 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (providing alternative bases for
admitting opinion surveys: first, that such surveys are not hearsay because they are not offered to prove
the truth of the matters asserted and that, even if hearsay, they fall under the exception of “present sense
impression”).
56. Irvin v. State, 66 So. 2d 288, 291–92 (Fla. 1953) (discussing a survey intended to show that
defendant could not get a fair jury pool based on the community’s widespread beliefs in racial
stereotypes).
57. People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33, 37 (Cal. 1968).
58. Id. at 39 (In Collins, a victim was robbed by a woman with a blond ponytail who escaped,
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One much-noted case in which statistical sampling was excluded was
Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. City of Inglewood.59 The issue was whether
Sears had correctly reported the proportion of sales made to non-residents
of the city, since such sales were not subject to sales tax.60 A statistician
testified that a random survey of 33 of 826 working days revealed that such
sales amounted to $28,250 with a standard deviation of $2,100 or a 95
percent confidence interval of $24,000 to $32,400 per quarter and then
projected those figures for the entire period.61 After the survey was not
admitted into evidence, Sears then undertook a complete audit of 950,000
transactions, finding the figure to be $26,750 per quarter—in other words,
just as predicted by the random sample.62
2. Use of Statistical Evidence in Litigation Increasing
Despite the early resistance to the judicial admissibility of statistical
evidence, its use in the courtroom is increasing.63 Survey sampling was
permitted in a case deciding trademark law, where consumer surveys
helped the petitioner support a claim of consumer confusion.64 Survey

according to witnesses, with a bearded, mustachioed black man driving a yellow car. The expert
calculated the probability multiplying the individual probabilities of the various factors (yellow car,
interracial couple, black man with beard, black man with mustache, woman with blond hair, and woman
with ponytail) to arrive at the estimate. Among other things, the court found, the analysis was faulty
because (1) the lack of evidence supporting the probabilities assumed by the expert, (2) inadequate
proof of the “statistical independence of the six factors” and therefore the appropriateness of applying
the multiplication rule, and (3) the risk that jurors were confused by the unchallenged admission of
mathematical “proof” of guilt).
59. R. Clay Sprowls, The Admissibility of Sample Data Into a Court of Law, 4 UCLA L. REV.
222–232 (1957) (discussing Los Angeles Superior Court case from 1955).
60. Symposium: Probability Sampling in Litigation, 18 CONN. INS. L.J. 297, 299 (2011-2012).
61. Diamond, supra note 2, at 228 n.12; Symposium: Probability Sampling in Litigation, supra
note 60, at 299.
62. R. Clay Sprowls, The Admissibility of Sample Data into a Court of Law: a Case History, 4
UCLA L. REV. 222, 226–29 (1956-1957). For discussion see Diamond, supra note 2, at 228 n.12;
Symposium: Probability Sampling in Litigation, supra note 60, at 299; Gregory Todd Jones & Reidar
Hagtvedt, Sample Data as Evidence: Meeting the Requirements of Daubert and the Recently Amended
Federal Rules of Evidence, 18 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 721, 727–28 (2002).
63. STEPHEN E. FEINBERG, THE EVOLVING ROLE OF STATISTICAL ASSESSMENTS AS EVIDENCE IN
THE COURTS 7–9 (1989) (Fienberg attributes the steep incline of the use of statistical evidence to the
following factors: (1) expanding government regulation raise factual issues calling for statistical
analysis, (2) the ease with which large masses of data can be managed and increased number of experts
able to use and interpret such data, (3) increased access of computer programs to process data, (4)
younger lawyers who are more trained and receptive to statistical information, (5) reliance on data at the
U.S. Supreme Court in high profile cases has increased its acceptability, (6) higher financial stakes in
litigation that increases the likelihood that attorneys and clients will invest in such data generation and
analysis, and (7) enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in the mid-70s that eased restrictions on
the use of expert witnesses, including those who specialized in statistical analysis).
64. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Impts., Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 680-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). For a study
concluding that surveys purporting to show consumer confusion are excluded more often than those that
show little or no consumer confusion, see MICHAEL O. FINKELSTEIN & BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR
LAWYERS, 269–70 (2d ed. 2001).
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sampling has been used in misleading advertising cases, venue challenges,
obscenity prosecutions and employment discrimination cases, among other
examples.65 This increase has brought with it concerns of a jury’s ability to
interpret data, particularly when experts differ on the evidence and its
significance.66 The increasing complexity of evidence has led to some calls
for courts to appoint neutral managerial experts:67 “‘[A] judge could better
fulfill this gatekeeper function if he or she had help from scientists [and
thus], [j]udges should be strongly encouraged to make greater use of their
inherent authority . . . to appoint experts.”68

IV. THE PROBLEM: SAMPLING AND NON-SAMPLING
ERRORS HAVE A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT IN LITIGATION
The use of sampling is routine in litigation today, and responsible use
thereof was defined in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.69
Responsible use includes following sampling methods that “conform to
generally recognized statistical standards,” as listed by the Federal Judicial
Center.70 These federal standards “include whether:





the population was properly chosen and defined;
the sample chosen was representative of that population;
the data gathered were accurately reported; and
the data were analyzed in accordance with accepted statistical
principles.”71

Simply meeting these statistical standards, however, is not enough.
While it can be difficult to determine an appropriate population for
sampling, sampling frame, or list of elements in this population, and data
collection methods to meet the above standards, these difficulties are well65. Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Sampling Evidence at the Crossroads, 80 S. CAL. L. REV.
969, 975–77 (2007).
66. Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK. L. REV.
1121, 1124–25 (2001).
67. Ellen E. Deason, Managing the Managerial Expert, U. ILL. L. REV. 341 (1998); Ellen E.
Deason, Court-Appointed Expert Witnesses: Scientific Positivism Meets Bias and Deference, 77 OR. L.
REV. 59 (1998).
68. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 150–51 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting amicus
brief of the New England Journal of Medicine) (noting that the Federal Rules of Evidence permitted the
appointment of independent experts).
69. U.S. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 305-06 (D. Mass. 1953) aff’d, 347 U.S.
521 (1954). See also HANS ZEISEL & DAVID KAYE, PROVE IT WITH FIGURES: EMPIRICAL METHODS IN
LAW AND LITIGATION 102 (1997).
70. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, § 11.493, at 103 (Stanley
Marcus et al., eds., 4th ed. 2004).
71. Id.
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known to sampling experts and are routinely addressed.72
More
problematic in many cases are the discrepancies between a valid theoretical
sample and the data that are actually collected. There are innumerable
ways in which a statistically-sound sample may be incorrectly
implemented, and if even one of them occurs, the resulting data must be
correctly reweighted, analyzed, and interpreted before meaningful
projections concerning the population of interest may be made; and even
then, results may not be accurate.73
To avoid these costly and often less-than-perfect solutions, Robert
Groves, Director of the U.S. Census Bureau, proposed an effective method
of collecting data that addresses, and seeks to minimize “Total Survey
Error.”74 In short, Groves notes that sampling error is only one of seven
sources of potential error that can render data misleading or even useless.75
These sources of error include problems of accurately identifying
information about population elements (specification error, measurement
error, and processing error) and problems of data collection as a whole
(coverage error, nonresponse error, sampling error, and adjustment error).76
While all seven are important, coverage and nonresponse error are
especially pernicious sources of error in today’s litigation.77
Fortunately, these two sources of error can be minimized if steps are
taken to guard against them before data collection, and check and adjust for
them afterwards.78 As was recommended in Fienberg’s The Evolving Role
of Statistical Assessments as Evidence in the Courts, after having been
collected, data should be statistically analyzed to control for non-response
error and non-sampling error (e.g., problems of coverage), and might also
be audited to “assess the extent to which there were deviations from stated
procedures, and what the effect on study results might be from those
deviations.”79
72. See, e.g., Joseph C. Bright, Jr., Joseph B. Kadane & Daniel S. Nagin, Statistical Sampling in
Tax Audits, 13 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 305, 305 (1988); ROBERT M. GROVES, SURVEY ERRORS AND
SURVEY COSTS 81–132, 239–94 (1989); ROBERT M. GROVES, ET AL., SURVEY METHODOLOGY 39–66
(2004); and Robert M. Groves, Nonresponse Rates and Nonresponse Bias in Household Surveys, 70
PUB. OPINION Q. 646, 646–75 (2006) [hereinafter Groves, Nonresponse Rates].
73. Groves, Nonresponse Rates supra note 72, at 646–75.
74. See ROBERT M. GROVES, ET AL., SURVEY METHODOLOGY 49 (2004).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Cf. MICHAEL O. FINKELSTEIN, BASIC CONCEPTS OF PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS IN THE LAW
98-101 (2009). Finkelstein uses the term “selection bias” for what Groves calls “coverage error” and
also names “response bias” (“measurement error” in Groves) as a third “principle variety” of bias at in
litigation surveys. However, addressing the reduction of measurement error is beyond the scope of this
paper except to note that measurement error may occur when respondent memory is faulty or when
surveys address sensitive issues.
78. ROBERT M. GROVES, SURVEY ERRORS AND SURVEY COSTS 81-183 (1989)
79. The Special Committee on Empirical Data in Legal Decision Making, Recommendations on
Pretrial Proceedings in Cases with Voluminous Data, in THE EVOLVING ROLE OF STATISTICAL
ASSESSMENTS AS EVIDENCE IN THE COURTS app. F, at 267 (Stephen E. Fienberg ed., 1988).
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Although these recommendations were made in 1989, and best
practices for conducting sample-based research have been well established
since then, too many of today’s litigators still unwittingly use faulty data to
support their cases. To avoid being one of those who misuse sample data,
one must be aware of and work to counteract the traps and pitfalls that have
ensnared many in the profession. Before one can look for problems in
procedure, however, one must first understand the proper theory of
sampling.
A. PROBABILITY AND NON-PROBABILITY SAMPLING COMPARED
There are two broad types of sampling that researchers may employ:
probability sampling and nonprobability sampling.80 Each will be defined,
evaluated, and discussed with regard to its application to litigation in turn.
Probability sampling is recommended for use in court, for reasons
given in the Federal Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence: “In all
forms of probability sampling, each element in the relevant population has
a known, nonzero probability of being included in the sample.”81
Probability sampling offers two important advantages over other types of
sampling:
First, the sample can provide an unbiased estimate that summarizes the
responses of all persons in the population from which the sample was
drawn; that is, the expected value of the sample estimate is the
population value being estimated. Second, the researcher can calculate a
confidence interval that describes explicitly how reliable the sample
estimate of the population is likely to be.82

In other words, probability sampling gives the researcher the ability to
predict a characteristic of a population with statistical accuracy.
To draw a probability sample, one must first know the general
characteristics of the population in which one is interested,83 such as “all
consumers of XYZ food products in the past twelve months,” “all female
employees of Alpha Corp,” or “all houses on Main Street.” Second, one
must identify an appropriate sampling frame—the list of population
elements from which one will draw the sample.84 For instance, tax auditing
cases could use as their sampling frame “the universe of documented
transactions available for audit.”85 Other sampling frames might be a
telephone book, a company’s employee directory, or a list of all public
schools in the country.86 Third, one must select the elements of the
80. Shari Seidman Diamond, Reference Guide on Survey Research, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 359, 361 (Fed. Judicial Ctr. ed., 3d ed. 2011).
81. Id. at 380
82. Diamond, supra note 80, at 380.
83. Id. at 376.
84. Id. at 377.
85. Bright, Kadane & Nagin, supra note 72, at 305–33.
86. Arne L. Kalleberg et al., Comparing Organizational Sampling Frames, 35 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 658,
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population to be included in the sample.87 As already noted, for “adequate
statistical sampling,” the sample drawn must be probabilistic in nature.88
Many strategies for drawing probability samples exist, from simple random
sampling to stratified sampling to cluster sampling, each has its own unique
advantages.89
One common form of probability sampling is simple random
sampling, where every element in a population has an equal chance of
being chosen for inclusion in the sample.90 With this type of statistical
sample, one should theoretically obtain a sample that is proportionally
similar to the population in every dimension.91 Even if different elements
of the population have different chances of being selected, though—for
instance, if one wanted to “oversample” a minority group to ensure
statistical significance of the results—one can still use statistical methods
to ensure a representative outcome. If one oversamples, for instance, one
can appropriately weight the groups before data analysis, as long as one
knew the probability of selecting a member of each group ahead of time.
For instance, a team of researchers interested in predicting violent
tendencies in emergency room patients in 1996 purposefully oversampled
black men and undersampled white women so that “patients likely to be
involved in violence were more prevalent in the sample” than in the
population as a whole, then reweighted the sample based on patients’
“ages, races, genders, and clinicians’ judgments about their dangerousness”
before conducting their analysis.92
As a more sedate example, the American Time Use Survey93 (often
used in litigation) collects data on each weekday from 10 percent of its
respondents, and data on time spent on Saturday or Sunday from 50 percent
of its respondents.94 From this overweighting of weekend data, it can
658 (1990); Peter M. Smith & Cameron A. Mustard, How Many Employees Receive Safety Training
During Their First Year of a New Job?, 13 INJ. PREVENTION 37, 37 (2007); Anne Cattagni & Elizabeth
Farris, Internet Access in U.S. Public Schools and Classrooms: 1994-2000, STATISTICS IN BRIEF
(National Center for Education Statistics, Washington D.C.), May 2001.
87. Diamond, supra note 80, at 380.
88. Id. As previously mentioned, probabilistic samples are samples based on known probabilities;
that is, every element in a population that might be selected for a sample has a known, nonzero chance
of inclusion. In contrast, nonprobabilistic samples do not meet this requirement. As an example, a study
where a researcher interviews carefully selected class members who share a certain opinion is
nonprobabilistic. Similarly, a mall-intercept study that approaches people who look like they might be
willing to answer a survey is not probabilistic; neither is a survey advertised in a publication that asks
all interested parties to volunteer and participate.
89. Id.; see generally LESLIE KISH, SURVEY SAMPLING (1965).
90. Diamond, supra note 80, at 380.
91. Id.
92. William Gardner et al., A Comparison of Actuarial Methods for Identifying Repetitively Violent
Patients with Mental Illnesses, 20 LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 35, 38 (1996).
93. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, AMERICAN TIME USE SURVEY – 2010
RESULTS 4 (2011), http://www.bls.gov/tus/.
94. Id.
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measure far more accurately how time spent on weekends compares to time
spent on weekdays on various activities.95
In opposition to probability samples, nonprobability samples tend to
be biased and are not generalizable, and so are not recommended for
statistical analysis.96 Sometimes there are good reasons for doing a
nonprobability sample—if a researcher does not know the characteristics of
the target population or it would be prohibitively expensive to do a
probability sample, he might still learn potentially valuable information
from a nonprobability sample.97 For instance, nonprobability consumer
surveys have been admitted as evidence in Lanham Act litigation based on
the fact that major companies use such surveys when making major
decisions,98 and self-report surveys have proved useful in criminological
research.99 In these instances, however, the Reference Manual on Scientific
Evidence directs experts to be prepared to justify their methods, to view
results as “rough indicators rather than as precise quantitative estimates,”
and to not calculate confidence intervals for the sample.100 Because of the
statistical limitations of non-probability samples, severe problems may
arise if one believes that the sample one has drawn is a probability-based
sample, when in fact it is not.101 If a study is based on a nonprobability
selection, it should so indicate, including an explanation of the methods
used in selecting the study sample.102
Basic warnings about nonprobability samples abound in academic
literature, from general advice against using them,103 to specific warnings
pertaining to a specific field.104 In the world of tax auditing, for instance,
Bright, Kadane, and Nagin note that if auditors “have preconceived ideas”
regarding where problems might be when fact-checking records, and
“exploit either their ideas or their initial findings in deciding where to look
95. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 93, at 8.
96. David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in REFERENCE MANUAL
ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 211, 223-25 (Fed. Jud. Center, 3d ed. 2011). See also, The Special
Committee on Empirical Data in Legal Decision Making, Recommendations on Pretrial Proceedings in
Cases with Voluminous Data, in THE EVOLVING ROLE OF STATISTICAL ASSESSMENTS AS EVIDENCE IN
THE COURTS app. F, at 261 (Stephen E. Fienberg ed., 1988) (“Nonprobability sampling is normally a
highly subjective operation and relies either on expert judgment, or other criteria, to select particular
units for the sample.”).
97. Diamond, supra note 80, at 381–82.
98. Id.
99. Josine Junger-Tas & Ineke Haen Marshall, The Self-Report Methodology in Crime Research,
25 CRIME & JUST. 291, 291 (1999).
100. Diamond, supra note 80, at 381–83.
101. Id.
102. The Special Committee on Empirical Data in Legal Decision Making, Recommendations on
Pretrial Proceedings in Cases with Voluminous Data, in THE EVOLVING ROLE OF STATISTICAL
ASSESSMENTS AS EVIDENCE IN THE COURTS app. F, at 261 (Stephen E. Fienberg ed., 1988).
103. Frederick W. H. Ho, L. Biggeri & Graham Kalton, Survey as a Source of Statistics and Factors
Affecting the Quality of Survey Statistics, 73 INTERNATIONAL STATISTICAL REVIEW 245, 245 (2005).
104. Bright, Kadane & Nagin, supra note 72, at 307.
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further . . . they are not entitled to treat the cases they examined as a
statistical sample, since they chose them purposely. Proper statistical
sampling is a skill distinct from auditing.”105
B. NONRESPONSE AND COVERAGE ERROR
While the danger of error due to nonprobability samples has been
made clear to the courts over the years, other potential non-sampling
sources of error in surveys have not been as well addressed in the world of
litigation. Nonresponse and problems of coverage are two of these subtler
sources of error in sample-based research. It is true that academia warns
researchers that “deviations from the sampling plan should be avoided,”106
that one should be cautious about drawing conclusions from samples with
too low a response rate,107 and that nonresponse bias is a significant
problem that must be addressed.108 Even so, many samples used in
litigation today are biased due to a failure to implement a properly designed
sampling plan.109 Both error sources can be minimized through careful data
collection techniques, post-survey research of the characteristics of
refusals, and weighting of the data,110 but only if the possibility of their
existence is recognized and identified through careful pre- and postcollection analysis.111 Several examples of common, but flawed, sampling
practices are given below as illustrations.
1. Example112
First is an example of simple nonresponse bias. A hypothetical
litigator wants to give a survey to all employees of XYZ Corp. to ascertain
whether discrimination has taken place. To do this, the litigator, or a
statistical consultant, first creates a randomized list of the population of
interest.113 Next, the litigator determines how many responses to the survey
(X) are necessary for statistical significance.114 Once that is known, the
105. Bright, Kadane & Nagin, supra note 72, at 307.
106. Id.
107. Diamond, supra note 80, at 382.
108. Groves, Nonresponse Rates, supra note 72, at 670.
109. Author’s Interview with Sean Chasworth, Statistical Expert, www.rule26.com, in Pasadena,
Cal. (Aug. 1, 2011).
110. See generally ROBERT M. GROVES. SURVEY ERRORS AND SURVEY COSTS (1989); ROBERT M.
GROVES ET AL., SURVEY METHODOLOGY (2004).
111. Diamond, supra note 80, at 377-379, 383–385.
112. These are original examples created by the authors of the paper, loosely based on general work
experience of said authors.
113. Putting lists in a random order is a staple of survey methodology, and can easily be done using
many computer programs, including Microsoft Excel.
114. The number of responses necessary for any given research question depends on the dispersion
of the data in the population, the desired precision of the estimate, and the type of statistical testing
required. The details of determining these figures are beyond the scope of this paper; for more
information, see LESLIE KISH, SURVEY SAMPLING (1965).
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firm’s agents are instructed to begin at the top of the randomized list and
collect survey data from the first X people on the list. If someone is
unavailable or chooses not to participate in the survey, however, the agents
are instructed to go on down the list until they reach X total participants.
On its surface, this survey seems methodologically sound. The
participants were randomly selected, with an equal chance of each
participant being chosen, so the results would seem to be a valid probability
sample. There is, however, a potential problem that the litigator has
overlooked: the characteristics of those who do not participate in the
survey. If those people who chose not to answer the survey are
fundamentally different in some way from those who did participate, and if
that difference is related to a variable that is pertinent to the litigation, then
the survey will not accurately reflect the population as a whole on those
variables.115 As the Federal Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence
notes,
Even when a sample is drawn randomly from a complete list of elements
in the target population, responses or measures may be obtained on only
part of the selected sample. If this lack of response is distributed
randomly, valid inferences about the population can be drawn with
assurance using the measures obtained from the available elements in the
sample. The difficulty is that nonresponse often is not random, so that,
for example, persons who are single typically have three times the “not
at home” rate in U.S. Census Bureau surveys as do family members
[citation omitted] . . . Determining whether the level of nonresponse in a
survey seriously impairs inferences drawn from the results of a survey
requires an analysis of the determinants of nonresponse. For example,
even a survey with a high response rate may seriously underrepresent
some portions of the population, such as the unemployed or the poor . . .
The survey expert should be prepared to provide evidence on the
potential impact of nonresponse on the survey results.116

It should also be noted that a low nonresponse rate does not ensure
that one’s sample is free from nonresponse bias. Variables such as
socioeconomic status, gender, race, and household size all impact
nonresponse rates, and so increasing response rates through measures that
do not increase minority participation rates can actually increase
nonresponse bias.117 For instance, offering a pen as an incentive to answer
an exit-polling survey increased Democrat responses more than Republican
responses, leading to a survey with higher response rates, but more biased
conclusions.118
From a litigation standpoint, it is even more important to note that
those who perceive themselves as having an economic self-interest in

115.
116.
117.
118.

Groves, supra note 78, at 133.
Diamond, supra note 80, at 383–85.
Nonresponse Rates supra note 72, at 664 .
Id. at 666.
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answering a survey are more likely to do so than those who do not consider
it worth their time to respond, as per the social exchange theory of survey
response.119 In the case of a discrimination suit, for instance, it is more in
the interest of those who believe that they have been discriminated
against—and perhaps have even filed lawsuits on their own—to respond
than it is for those who do not believe there are grounds for a
discrimination case. This means that people who do not believe that
discrimination has occurred are more likely to refuse to answer the survey
than are those who do believe that discrimination has occurred. Clearly, if
this discrepancy between respondents is not identified, the resulting survey
would be biased to overestimate the amount of discrimination taking place
in XYZ Corp. Before analysis, then, any potential nonresponse bias in the
survey data must be identified and minimized.
Coverage error also stems from a lack of responses from relevant
population members. In this case, however, it happens when elements are
left off a sampling frame on which they belong, thereby taking away their
proper chance of being included in a sample.120 This could occur, for
example, on a case that requires analysis of employee timesheets. If certain
groups of data are difficult to access—for instance, if they are stored in
boxes in the back of a warehouse or on damaged computer files—then it is
conceivable that the actual data collected would be significantly different
from the original list of which data should be collected. This could be
problematic if the distribution of data is not random, but is rather grouped
by date or by department.
Similarly, consider a class action suit where affected members live in
three neighborhoods, two of which are middle-class neighborhoods and one
of which is a wealthy gated community. If an interviewer is unable to get
immediate access to that community, he or she might decide to skip it and
only interview members of the middle-class neighborhoods. This,
however, would significantly underestimate the actual income levels of the
class.
As a final example of coverage error, it is fairly common in classaction suits for several different classes to be legally combined into one
larger class, and treated as a single group. However, legal commonality
does not always translate to statistical commonality. If a sample is drawn
only from one of several subclasses—perhaps because it is the easiest to
access, or the largest, or preferable from some other demographic
characteristic—the results of the survey may not be generalizable to other
subclasses of the overall class. For example, if a group of actors and tech
crew all file suits against a particular Hollywood studio, the cases might be
combined into a single class-action suit.
However, it would be
119. DON A. DILLMAN, JOLENE D. SMYTH, AND LEAH MELANI CHRISTIAN, INTERNET, MAIL, AND
MIXED-MODE SURVEYS: THE TAILORED DESIGN METHOD 16–23 (3rd ed. 2009).
120. WILLIAM G. COCHRAN, SAMPLING TECHNIQUES 396 (3rd ed. 1977).
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inappropriate to survey only members of the lighting crew, or only actors,
to identify the specific grievances held, and the damages sought, by the
entire class. Furthermore, even taking a random sample of the entire
population would likely lead to significant bias if employment data from
actors and technical crew members are combined without regard for their
specific professions.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
To avoid performing biased analysis, researchers (and those who hire
them) should take care to follow best practices to minimize Total Survey
Error, both while collecting data, and after the data-collection process.
First, samples should be probability-based. This “maximizes both the
representativeness of the survey results and the ability to assess the
accuracy of estimates obtained from the survey,” as the Federal Reference
Manual on Scientific Evidence makes clear.121
Second, samples should be drawn from a proper sampling frame that
gives every relevant member of the population a known chance of being
selected for inclusion in the sample. After the sample has been selected,
accurate records should be kept of refusals, failures to contact, ineligibility,
completions, etc., as well as relevant demographic information (race, sex,
age, neighborhood, income, etc.) that can help distinguish those who
participate in the study from those who do not. Recording these different
types of nonresponses during the data collection process, while not
commonly done, can make one’s later analysis far easier, more accurate,
and more precise.
Third, after sample data has been collected, statistical analysis should
be performed on the sample itself to determine any unrepresentative
qualities of the sample and correct for them. This can only be accurately
done if the sample is a probability sample, and if relevant demographic data
has been recorded both for the sample and for the population, but it is a
crucial step. If the sample is representative, then analysis can proceed with
confidence. If the sample is not representative, the following steps could
be taken to statistically reweight or otherwise improve the generalizability
of the sample.
To correctly reweight a sample, collected data can be statistically
compared to theoretical outcomes and population values based on
demographic information. For litigation, relevant categories might include
not only traditional demographic measures, but such variables as whether
or not the respondent is in a protected class and whether or not the
respondent had previously filed a lawsuit against the company. If there
were sub-classes of respondents previously identified (such as actors and
technical crew members in the example above), these subclass distinctions
121. Diamond, supra note 80, at 380.
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could also be used to help identify the representativeness of the sample.
If the data are not representative, then the statistician might reweight
them by subclasses to approximate the theoretical population. For instance,
if the population was composed of 50 percent males and 50 percent
females, but the sample drawn had 30 percent males and 70 percent
females, then male values would have to be weighted by 1.67 and female
values would have to be weighted by 0.71 to accurately calculate a
population average. This type of reweighting is both routine and
recommended, and can easily be performed by statisticians given accurate
population parameters.
Even if information about the population is unknown, however, it is
still vital to perform a statistical analysis of the sample data to identify
differences between subgroups. There is a difference, for instance,
between knowing that 10 percent of the sample suffered wrongful injury,
and knowing that 90 percent of a certain subgroup suffered the wrongful
injuries, while nearly no people from other subgroups were affected. These
differences should also be easy for statisticians to calculate using crosstabulations, regression, Fisher’s Exact Tests, resampling, or other
appropriate methodologies.
Whatever may be discovered, it is also vital that the sample’s
restrictions be taken into account, so that it is not used inappropriately or to
make claims that it cannot support.122 While sampling is a very powerful
technique, bad samples can be severely flawed in their capacity to provide
meaning, and can be misleading if used incorrectly. For ethical reasons,
then, it is important to verify that one’s sample has been collected as was
directed, and then to correct or at least acknowledge any weaknesses
remaining in the sample before proceeding to analysis.

V. CASE STUDY
The following is a case study drawn from recent work done by the
authors that illustrates the importance of following proper survey
methodology in issues of litigation. While the case presented settled
confidentially in 2011 and thus allows for neither precedent nor appropriate
citations, the methodology used in the litigation—and what followed from
it—provides a clear example of how the problems raised in this paper can
affect legal decisions.
Seventeen individuals living in the same subdivision, governed by a
homeowners’ association, filed separate construction defect suits due to
various flaws in their homes, such as leaky windows and improperly
122. See also AAPOR Code of Professional Ethics and Practices, AAPOR (last modified May
2010), http://www.aapor.org/AAPOR_Code_of_Ethics/4249.htm (for more specific best practices).
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installed plumbing. Shortly after this, the homeowners’ association itself
filed a class action construction defects suit on behalf of all its members.
The court, rather than having to try eighteen similar cases, consolidated all
of these filings into one class action lawsuit.
During the discovery phase, it was necessary to identify the exact
nature and extent of the flaws with the homes in the subdivision. Clearly,
seventeen of the homes had already been self-identified as having defects.
The defendant, however, asserted that these problems did not extend to the
rest of the subdivision—over one hundred other homes. Determining
which houses had defects, and the type and extent of defects that existed,
was neither easy nor inexpensive, as walls had to be removed, floors torn
up, and similar “destructive tests” had to be done to determine whether or
not various installations were defective. To conserve time and resources,
the plaintiffs’ experts decided to take a simple random sample of the homes
in the subdivision, then extrapolate the results of this sample to the
population of homeowners.
While the decision to take a sample was appropriate, the
implementation of this decision was problematic. On its surface, the
sampling process was uncontroversial: the experts randomized the entire
list of homeowners from which they drew their sample, and then decided to
draw the first thirteen units for inclusion in the sample. (Thus, there was
no coverage error.) However, if a house selected for inclusion in the
sample chose not to participate, field workers were instructed to go on to
the next house on the randomized list, and so to continue until they
obtained thirteen participants.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, many homes contacted from the randomized
list chose not to participate in the sample and undergo the destructive tests
necessary to determine whether or not their home had been improperly
constructed. Field workers neither recorded the reasons for refusals nor
distinguished between failures to contact and refusals after contact.
Similarly, they did not distinguish between previous litigants and
nonlitigants when collecting data, but treated all potential respondents as
though they were from a homogeneous class.
After the sample was collected, the plaintiffs’ statisticians apparently
made no attempt to determine its generalizability by, for instance,
comparing its demographic characteristics to those of the known population
(the subdivision). Instead, they assumed that the average number of defects
per house found in the sample would reasonably approximate the average
value for the subdivision as a whole. With this assumption, they simply
multiplied the sample average by an appropriate dollar amount per defect
by the total number of houses in the subdivision to calculate damages for
the class.
The plaintiffs’ experts’ lack of post-data collection analysis led to an
embarrassing situation when statisticians retained by the defense examined
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their sample and cross-referenced the results with other data. First, the
sample’s composition proved to be strongly biased towards previous
litigants due to differential rates of response across sub-classes. While only
14.2 percent of the total homeowners had previously filed construction
defect suits, 53.8 percent of the sample had previously filed these suits.
This was a significant difference, and one that could have easily been
identified if demographic information had been collected and used in
sample analysis, or if the subclass of previous litigants had been sampled
separately from the subclass of non-litigants.
Second, the defense’s statisticians analyzed the differences between
the numbers of defects found in the homes of those who had previously
filed suits and those who had not. Significant nonresponse bias was found:
Individual plaintiffs had far more defects per home than did others in the
homeowners’ association. On average, the sample overestimated the
number of defects per home by more than 25 percent.
These discrepancies are understandable when one takes into account
economic self-interest, as discussed above. As opposed to the plaintiffs’
assumption that all nonresponses would be randomly assigned (an
assumption all too common in litigation and not easily testable), from an
economic model it makes sense that respondents with more to gain or who
have a vested interest in the results of a sample would be willing to
undergo higher costs to participate in the sample. In this case, since all
sample participants had to undergo very high costs to participate (agreeing
to destructive testing of their homes), those who already believed that their
houses had defects were far more likely to participate than were those who
had no such beliefs.
If proper data collection and post-data analysis procedures had been
followed, even this flawed sample could have been weighted to properly
reflect the relevant characteristics of the population and provide an estimate
of damages that could have stood up to statistical scrutiny. It was not,
however, and after the discovery of the aforementioned data problems the
case quickly settled.

VI. CONCLUSION
As evidenced above, it is vital to plan for and implement proper
statistical analysis that can reduce Total Survey Error before, during, and
after the sampling process. While not difficult for trained statisticians to
perform, this analysis needs to be included in the list of budgeted tasks that
they are assigned. Before data collection, relevant demographic variables
that might bias the resulting sample should be identified and an appropriate
method of sampling decided upon. It should be noted that these variables
are often case-specific, and may be better known to the legal team than to
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third party experts who are unfamiliar with the case. During data
collection, any deviations from the theoretical sampling process should be
noted and information collected to help determine the extent and type of
nonresponse bias present in the sample.123 Demographic data pertaining to
the sample should also be collected for post-sample analysis of differences
between subgroups. Finally, after data have been collected, statisticians
must analyze the composition of the sample and, if necessary, reweight it to
minimize the impact of bias. As illustrated by the case study, making
simplistic assumptions can be inaccurate, can lead to unwarranted
conclusions, and can also be potentially dangerous to one’s arguments and
positions. Instead, by following proper statistical procedure before, during,
and after sampling, one can lean with confidence on the results and
extrapolations of a sample that is worthy of being used in court.

123. See THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH, STANDARD DEFINITIONS:
FINAL DISPOSITIONS OF CASE CODES AND OUTCOME RATES FOR SURVEYS 7–12 (7th ed. 2011).
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